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Many have advocated for collaborative governance and the participation of citizens and
stakeholders on the basis that it can improve the environmental outcomes of public decision making,
as compared to traditional, top-down decision making. Others, however, point to the potential
negative effects of participation and collaboration on environmental outcomes. This article draws
on several literatures to identify five clusters of causal mechanisms describing the relationship
between participation and environmental outcomes. We distinguish (i) mechanisms that describe
how participation impacts on the environmental standard of outputs, from (ii) mechanisms relating
to the implementation of outputs. Three mechanism clusters focus on the role of representation of
environmental concerns, participants’ environmental knowledge, and dialogical interaction in
decision making. Two further clusters elaborate on the role of acceptance, conflict resolution, and
collaborative networks for the implementation of decisions. In addition to the mechanisms, linking
independent with dependent variables, we identify the conditions under which participation may
lead to better (or worse) environmental outcomes. This helps to resolve apparent contradictions in
the literature. We conclude by outlining avenues for research that builds on this framework for
analysis.
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To advocate democracy is to advocate procedures, to advocate environmentalism is
to advocate substantive outcomes: what guarantee can we have that the former pro-
cedures will yield the latter sorts of outcomes?
—Goodin (1992, p. 168)
1. Governance Modes as Interventions: Moving Beyond Competing Claims
about Effectiveness of Participation and Collaboration
Scholars and public administrators are increasingly engaging with participatory
and collaborative modes of governance in order to improve environmental outcomes
of public decision making. The motives and rationales for public participation, which
have traditionally centered around notions of emancipation and legitimacy, have
been shifting toward an expectation of increased effectiveness of governance. Follow-
ing this instrumental rationale (Newig, 2012), participation is advocated and used to
open up decision making, integrating local knowledge, and the perspectives of a
multitude of actors (Edelenbos, Van Buuren, & van Schie, 2011), and to promote
acceptance and implementation of decisions (Bulkeley & Mol, 2003). Participation is
thus assumed to lead “to a higher degree of sustainable and innovative outcomes”
(Heinelt, 2002, p. 17). Many observers have argued that the success of collaborative
and participatory governance will ultimately be judged by its ability to improve
environmental conditions (e.g., Beierle & Cayford, 2002).
However, it is precisely the capacity to solve environmental problems that
remains disputed (Dietz & Stern, 2008; Lange, Driessen, Sauer, Bornemann, & Bur-
ger, 2013; Young et al., 2013), because while collaborative governance continues to
proliferate, there is still no consensus on its performance (Gerlak, Lubell, & Heikkila,
2013). Even where strong relations between collaborative processes and environmen-
tal outcomes are empirically established, it remains unclear why and how this is the
case (Scott, 2015). Furthermore, competing claims as to the effectiveness of collabora-
tive and participatory approaches pose a dilemma for “green democracy,” introduc-
ing “tension between democratic means and environmental ends” (Wong, 2015,
p. 138). Different fields of study have made a variety of arguments on the pros and
cons of participation with respect to environmental outcomes. The existing literature
is therefore fragmented, and leaves us with logical inconsistencies. Clearly, environ-
mental benefits of participatory decision making are not automatic, but rather are
contingent on an array of intervening factors (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004).
This article seeks to move a step forward by integrating existing claims from
multiple research fields on the link between participation and outcomes into a coher-
ent framework of causal mechanisms.
We are not the first to develop a conceptual framework on participatory or col-
laborative governance. Ansell and Gash (2008) have put forward a literature-based
model explaining the general “success” of collaboration. Emerson and Nabatchi
(2015), drawing on Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh (2011), present a yet more general
framework including the drivers, dynamics, impacts, and adaptive responses of
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“collaborative governance regimes.” While building on these valuable contributions,
our focus is more specific. Emerson and colleagues, in particular, study more institu-
tionalized collaborative governance regimes. We theorize on public decision making
processes (DMPs). These can be more or less participatory and collaborative. Our
framework, therefore, explicitly incorporates and reflects on nonparticipatory and
noncollaborative alternatives.
Decision makers are often able to choose the extent to which a DMP is going to
be participatory or collaborative. Collaboration and participation, then, are a choice
rather than a necessity. In this sense, we depart from Emerson and Nabatchi’s (2015)
notion of collaborative governance as processes “to carry out a public purpose that
could not otherwise be accomplished” (p. 2, emphasis added). Rather, we conceive of
governance modes as strategic interventions that can help achieve certain goals (Scott
& Thomas, 2017). The key rationale of our framework is thus to provide reasoned
assumptions on which modes of governance are likely to be effective (in environ-
mental terms) under which circumstances.
The causal framework we present comprises five clusters of core mechanisms,
which address the relationship between governance modes and (i) the environmen-
tal standard of outputs, and (ii) implementation of outputs. We disaggregate these
mechanisms as far as possible, to isolate causal relations between important variables
in the policy process, and tease out the often implicit assumptions on which each
mechanism rests. We therefore not only specify and clarify hypothesized causal
mechanisms between participation and environmental outcomes, but also identify
the contextual conditions under which participation may lead to better (or worse)
environmental outcomes.
Our focus lies on the instrumental value of collaboration and participation in
environmental governance. We acknowledge that participatory and collaborative
environmental decision making may have a range of nonenvironmental outcomes
that would be important to consider in gauging the overall impact of a DMP (Rogers
& Weber, 2010). In this article, however, we deliberately limit our focus to the impli-
cations of decision making for the environment. We do not advance any particular
“pro” or “anti” participation argument, but rather seek to examine in detail what we
suggest are the most important mechanisms. The mechanisms identified and exam-
ined below have been refined from ongoing meta-analytic research examining a
large body of case study evidence on collaborative and participatory environmental
decision making (Newig, Adzersen, Challies, Fritsch, & Jager, 2013), and draw on a
range of works from inter alia political science, public administration, legal studies,
social psychology, environmental studies, decision science, mediation, and conflict
resolution.
Examining gaps and contradictions among these mechanisms, as well as key
conditioning factors, we aim to identify important variables for empirical investiga-
tion, and to integrate competing claims as to the effectiveness of collaborative and
participatory environmental governance. This is useful for two reasons: First, it
should provide a point of reference for future theorizing and hypothesizing. Comple-
mentary or competing hypotheses, or refined causal mechanisms, can be compared
against this framework, potentially improving the conceptual basis of participatory
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governance. Second, it can and should guide and organize empirical enquiry by
helping to focus on relevant empirical factors for assessing participation and its out-
comes in single or comparative case studies, and by guiding the interpretation of
findings. Such a framework should thus aid the generation and consolidation of
robust evidence on the “instrumental” value of collaborative and participatory
modes of environmental governance. In contrast to recent frameworks that describe
collaboration in ideal-typical terms (e.g., Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Emerson et al.,
2011), we seek to conceptualize different dimensions of participation, and identify
the precise mechanisms that link these dimensions with outcomes.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our conceptual framework for
the analysis of participatory DMPs and clarifies key terms used in the article. Section
3 presents the core mechanisms on opening up decision making, incorporation of
environmentally relevant knowledge, dialogue, veto players, conflict resolution,
acceptance, and capacity building for implementation and compliance, based on a
thorough review of the literature. Both positive and negative mechanisms linking
participation and effectiveness are elaborated. Section 4 concludes the article with
reflections on the key insights gained, the potential and limitations of our frame-
work, and future research directions.
2. Conceptual Framework and Definition of Key Terms
We consider the participation of nonstate actors in public decision making and
how they interact and collaborate to reach collectively binding decisions on environ-
mental issues. This captures a wide variety of governance modes and “degrees” of
participation and collaboration in planning, licensing, rule-making, impact assess-
ment, and other forms of public policymaking. The core concept is that of a DMP.
A DMP may be initiated in a “top-down” or a “bottom-up” fashion, and may com-
prise a single process or several related (sub-)processes (e.g., public hearings, task
forces, round tables, citizen advisory committees, etc.) that are, to a greater or lesser
extent, participatory or collaborative.
“Participatory governance” and “collaborative governance” are two concepts
widely addressed in the academic literature, which have much in common. An
abbreviated version of Emerson and Nabatchi’s (2015) definition of collaborative
governance as “processes and structures of public policy decision making and
management that engage people across the boundaries of public agencies, levels
of government and/or the public, private for-profit, and civic spheres to carry
out a public purpose [. . .]” resonates with our understanding of participatory
governance. Yet both concepts have their individual features. “Participatory gov-
ernance”—the more widely used term in Europe1—stresses the involvement of
actors who are not normally charged with decision making. This may include
formats such as public hearings or other forms of consultation that are of a non-
“collaborative” nature in the stricter sense. “Collaborative governance”—more
common in the North American context—emphasizes the process of working
together. Both concepts, from their own perspective, entail the respective other:
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From the perspective of participatory governance, collaboration is one form of
interaction (out of many); from the perspective of collaborative governance, par-
ticipation is one element (out of many).
Here, we consider participation as the overarching variable in DMPs. We are
principally concerned with DMPs as chains of events geared toward specific out-
comes, and less so with enduring collaborative regimes that typically entail iterative
dynamics. Within participatory processes, collaboration features as an important cat-
egory, and almost all of the studied mechanisms refer to collaborative settings. Par-
ticipation is understood here as a three-dimensional concept, and can be more or less
“intensive” in each of these governance dimensions (Fung, 2006; Newig & Kvarda,
2012):
1. Breadth of involvement: The range of stakeholders2 and other actors included in
the process (e.g., involvement of few selected experts, representatives of orga-
nized groups, or citizens vs. the general public).
2. Communication and collaboration: The manner, direction, and intensity of informa-
tion flows (e.g., one-way information provision vs. collaborative development
of preferences).
3. Power delegation to participants: The extent to which participants are afforded
influence over the decisions to be taken.
Taking this into account, we define participatory governance as processes and
structures of public decision making that engage actors from the private sector, civil society,
and/or the public at large, with varying degrees of communication, collaboration, and delega-
tion of decision power to participants.
The implication of the three-dimensional conceptualization is that these dimen-
sions are in principle independent of each other, meaning that any given DMP can
score “high” in one dimension but “low” in another. For example, there are gover-
nance modes with high levels of power delegation such as public referenda, in which
collaboration is virtually absent.
The mechanisms comprising the framework relate to one or more of these
dimensions treated as independent variables, which are assumed to produce social
and/or environmental outcomes.3 For analytical purposes, a DMP concludes with
the production of a substantive output such as a collectively binding decision or
plan. The process may also generate a variety of social outcomes, depending on the
nature and degree of participation and collaboration. These may include: individual
and collective learning, awareness raising, acceptance of the process and output, con-
flict resolution and trust-building, and strengthening social capital and networks
among stakeholders (Newig et al., 2013). A participatory DMP may also generate
negative outcomes by, for example, eroding trust among participants and stakehold-
ers, alienating the public, or triggering new conflicts. Ultimately, the interaction of
environmental outputs and social outcomes shape the quality and extent of imple-
mentation and compliance.
The mechanisms presented in the following section are summarized in Figure 1.
Following Elster (1989), we assume that “[a] mechanism provides a continuous and
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contiguous chain of causal or intentional links between the explanans and the
explanandum” (cited in Hedstr€om & Ylikoski, 2010, p. 51).
Mechanisms relate, first, to the link between independent and dependent varia-
bles. To aid the more precise identification of causal mechanisms, we disaggregate
what often appear in the literature as complex, multistep mechanisms—or merely
hypotheses linking different variables—into basic steps in a causal chain. We thus
identify 19 mechanisms relating participation to outputs, and outcomes. We present
these in five clusters, reflecting five fundamental ways in which participation and
collaboration are assumed to affect environmental outcomes. We recognize, second,
that causal relations depend not only on these mechanisms, but also on their interac-
tion with the surrounding context. Specification of the context within which a given
mechanism works is an important, yet often ignored, step in assessing its explana-
tory power (Falleti & Lynch, 2009), and we therefore seek to account for contextual
conditioning factors (sensu Berry, Golder, & Milton, 2012) at each stage of the process,
both internal and external to DMPs—that is, broadly within and beyond the control
of process organizers (see Figure 2 for a schematic overview). Of the plethora of
Figure 1. Overview of Mechanisms Linking Participation to Environmental and Social Outcomes.
Note: The mechanisms are organized in clusters (Roman numerals) and individual mechanisms (Ara-
bic numerals within clusters). Plus signs (1) denote reinforcing relationships, minus signs (–) denote
weakening relationships. For example, the top left arrow combines mechanisms M I.1a (positive influ-
ence of “opening up” on representation of environmental concerns) and M I.1b (negative influence).
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contextual variables potentially impacting environmental outcomes, we focus here
on those factors likely to influence the identified mechanisms.
3. Mechanisms Linking Participation and Collaboration
to Environmental Outcomes
In this main section, we outline in detail each of the mechanisms we identified,
and discuss the conditioning variables that affect them.
3.1. Cluster I: Opening Up of Decision Making to Environmental Concerns
It has been widely argued that the inclusion of environmental concerns—for
example, as represented by environmental NGOs and environmental administra-
tion—in participatory governance structures leads to more environmentally
beneficial decisions (Dryzek, 2005; Smith, 2003). First, we consider—in two subme-
chanisms—whether and how the opening-up of decision making to nonstate actors
increases representation of environmental concerns.
1. Opening up and the representation of environmental concerns. Opening up decision
making to actors not normally included may have substantial impacts on the repre-
sentation of actors and interests, including environmental concerns:
M I.1a: Opening up a DMP to nonstate actors allows previously excluded groups,
including environmental groups, to participate, thus increasing representation of
environmental concerns in a DMP.
M I.1b: Opening up a DMP to nonstate actors decreases representation of environ-
mental concerns.
Conventional public environmental DMPs “often fail to incorporate the whole
range of environmental values” (Smith, 2003, p. 129). Opening up a DMP can create
Figure 2. Schematic Depiction of Causal Mechanisms Linking Modes of Governance (Participation/
Collaboration-Related Factors5 Independent Variables) to Outputs and Their Implementation
(5 Dependent Variables).
Note: These mechanisms operate under constraining and enabling contexts termed conditioning varia-
bles, collectively discussed in more detail in Section 3. The dashed line separates the DMP from its
context.
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opportunities for greater representation of a broader range of stakeholders from
many—often underrepresented or marginalized—sectors of society (Fung, 2006).
Hence, such representation may significantly alter the distribution of actors and
interests involved. Arguably, environmental groups and other actors motivated by
environmental concerns will have a strong incentive to participate in a DMP affect-
ing environmental matters, and thus be rather strongly represented (Larson & Lach,
2008). Paradoxically, opening-up decision making in this way could also weaken
the position of environmental concerns, as potentially opposing concerns might
dominate.
Whether or not a participatory process substantially increases the representa-
tion of environmental concerns (M I.1a vs. M I.1b) depends on both the potential
participants, and how the process is designed.
 Stakeholders’ environmental orientation: Depending on the issue and the scope of
the DMP, stakeholders may be more or less strongly oriented toward the environ-
ment (Fung, 2006; Larson & Lach, 2008; Newig & Fritsch, 2009). This may depend
inter alia on the spatial scale of decision making. Decisions at the local level tend
to be biased toward economic development at the expense of environmental val-
ues (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004; Koontz, 1999; Layzer, 2002).
 Willingness to participate: Stakeholders’ willingness to participate varies (Newig,
2007). Actors weigh up expected costs and benefits of participation, considering
the likelihood of their influencing the decision (Turner & Weninger, 2005). This is
particularly true for environmental groups that have to gain or maintain credibil-
ity (Holzinger, 2000; Whelan & Lyons, 2005). Further, actors tend not to partici-
pate when they perceive their concerns to be already sufficiently represented
(Diduck & Sinclair, 2002), or when they anticipate manipulation by more power-
ful participants (Purdy, 2012).
 Stakeholder capacity: Well-resourced actors are more able and more likely to partic-
ipate (Diduck & Sinclair, 2002; Fung, 2006; Fung & Wright, 2001). Environmental
groups tend to have comparatively few resources at their disposal (Ansell &
Gash, 2008; Layzer, 2002), often working on a voluntary or nonprofit basis. Where
meetings and other participation events are held during work hours, and where
attendance necessitates travel, the costs, especially to small, nonprofessionalized,
and local environmental groups, are relatively high. Access to resources and
capacity to meaningfully participate is often related to geographical scale: Stake-
holder representatives at regional or national levels are usually selected on
competency-based criteria, and have access to more professional resources than
their counterparts at local levels of governance (Rockloff & Moore, 2006).
 Open versus inclusive process: The aforementioned stakeholder-related factors can-
not be considered in isolation from the participatory process design. It makes a
difference whether a DMP is “open” (to everyone), relying essentially on self-
recruitment of participants, or whether it is “inclusive” in that the organizers
deliberately follow strategies to invite and introduce certain stakeholders to the
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process, aiming for a balanced and representative group (Fung, 2006). Targeted
stakeholder selection helps to offset underrepresentation of environmental con-
cerns, as can the use of positive incentives, the reimbursement of attendance
costs, and the choice of appropriate process timeframes and meeting locations
(Johnston, Hicks, Nan, & Auer, 2011).
To sum up, a participatory process is more likely to lead to stronger representation
of environmental concerns when stakeholders show a strong environmental orienta-
tion and a strong tendency to participate (M I.1a). Completely open processes are
prone to suffer from imbalances of participants, making underrepresentation of envi-
ronmental concerns more likely (M I.1b). Processes employing specific measures to
target and support otherwise under-resourced stakeholder groups potentially con-
tribute to strong representation of environmental concerns.
2. Representation of environmental concerns and environmental quality of decisions. A
second pair of mechanisms addresses the extent to which the inclusion of environ-
mental concerns impacts positively or negatively on the environmental quality of
decisions:
M I.2a: Increased representation of environmental concerns in a DMP fosters envi-
ronmental advocacy, impacting positively on the environmental quality of the output.
M I.2b: Increased representation of environmental concerns in a DMP weakens the
position of environmental groups vis-a-vis more powerful actors, impacting nega-
tively on the environmental quality of the output.
M I.2a assumes that environmental actors, by participating in a DMP, have bet-
ter chances to advocate for their concerns than if they were not involved. The partic-
ular values, arguments, and knowledge (see cluster II) brought to the table by
proponents of environmental interests can enhance the environmental quality of
outputs (Brody, 2003). This may happen by convincing other actors and coalitions
engaged in the process.
M I.2b, by contrast, argues first that in participatory processes, environmental
groups may be co-opted by more powerful actors. The cordial relationships often
developed among parties in collaborative processes may lead to greater concessions
on the part of environmental groups (“pacification” or “seduction”) (Amy, 1987).
The obligation for participants to engage “reasonably” can stifle expressions of
objection and frustration, which may be seen as counterproductive and noncon-
structive. In this way, participation can serve to suppress and dilute the concerns
and convictions that environmental groups bring to the table. Second, environmen-
tal groups may be deprived of other, more effective ways to pursue environmental
concerns (Berry, 1981). By taking part in a DMP—or choosing to “play the consen-
sus game” (Whelan & Lyons, 2005)—groups may lose recourse to means of chal-
lenging power from outside of participatory settings, such as lawsuits, protest, or
direct action. This may result in an overall loss of influence for environmental
groups (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bulkeley & Mol, 2003; Fung & Wright, 2001). Indeed,
under some circumstances effective influence may only be possible in confrontation
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with authorities (Whelan & Lyons, 2005).
What determines whether representation of environmental concerns in a DMP
improves or weakens the environmental quality of a decision, and whether actors
pursuing environmental goals are able to effectively influence decisions in collabo-
rative settings?
 Process characteristics: Professional facilitation or mediation, along with clear rules
and procedures, can help overcome power imbalances and avoid co-optation of
(environmental) groups (Amy, 1987; Cooke, 2001).
 Trust among participants: Co-optation is more likely to occur in trustful settings.
Conversely, where distrust prevails, participants may be viewed by their adver-
saries as more powerful than they actually are (see Leach & Sabatier, 2005, on
“devil-shift”).
 Participant characteristics: Participants may be more or less prone to co-optation
and devil-shift. This likely depends on actors’ political, legal, and technical
resources (Ley & Weber, 2015). Stakeholders will decide strategically whether to
participate and focus their skills and resources in a given process, or to pursue
their interests in alternative venues with greater perceived benefits (Lubell, 2013;
Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999). Some actors, however, do not have full knowl-
edge of the alternatives open to them (Holzinger, 2000), let alone of those open to
other actors, which can lead actors to stay in the process at the risk of being co-
opted. Further, environmental stakeholders may possess fewer resources for
“outside process” campaigns such as litigation or organizing public protests
(Whelan & Lyons, 2005).
3.2. Cluster II: Incorporation of Environmentally Relevant Knowledge
A second strand of thinking builds on the assumption that participation
strengthens the knowledge base of decisions through incorporating different kinds
of (e.g., local and/or lay) knowledge that are relevant to understanding and address-
ing the environmental problem at hand, thereby enhancing environmental policy
outputs and their implementability (Beierle & Cayford, 2002; Fazey et al., 2013;
Fischer, 2000; Fung, 2006; Ostrom, 1990; Ulibarri, 2015).
1. Relevance of lay and local knowledge for decision making
M II.1: Involving actors directly occupied with the environmental issues at hand in
decision making, leads to a higher degree of environmentally relevant knowledge
and knowledge relevant for implementation being made available to the DMP.
As Smith (2003, p. 62) notes: “Too often, decision makers [. . .] are far removed
from the impact of their decisions, and the experiences, knowledge and perspec-
tives of those whose practices are more attuned to the change in ecosystems are not
articulated.” Involving stakeholders in decision making may improve the informa-
tion base in different ways, depending on the nature of both the uncertainties at
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issue, and the relevance of the knowledge held by stakeholders for addressing the
problem at hand.
Stakeholders—or “knowledge holders” (Schmitter, 2002)—may hold local knowl-
edge that is more accurate than knowledge normally available to decision makers. Sci-
entific models may simply be wrong or inadequate if they fail to take account of local
conditions (Fischer, 2000; Wynne, 1992). Further, local actors may have specific knowl-
edge that can complement existing models (i.e., specialist knowledge, Wynne, 1992).
Through participatory processes, authorities may also gain insights into the social
context within which measures will be implemented. For example, officials may learn
whether and how stakeholders communicate and interact, what local norms and cus-
toms prevail, what competing stakes exist, and what the social “costs” of implementa-
tion might be. In this way, authorities may better anticipate the extent of local
acceptance of proposed measures (van Asselt & Rotmans, 2002), and thereby learn
about the likelihood of implementation and compliance (Newig, Pahl-Wostl, & Sigel,
2005).
Conditioning factors for M II.1 include:
 Knowledge deficit (decision maker): As stated above, a certain lack of knowledge on the
part of decision makers is an obvious precondition (Hurlbert & Gupta, 2015). This,
however, may not be easily recognized in practice. Decision makers may not per-
ceive a knowledge deficit, whereas in reality stakeholders could actually contribute
relevant and valuable knowledge to inform decision making.
 Knowledgeable stakeholders: To contribute meaningfully, stakeholders must be suffi-
ciently knowledgeable (Geissel, 2009). Therefore, if knowledge input is important
to the process, then those stakeholders who are likely to provide this knowledge
should be invited to participate. This may require tailoring the spatial scale of a
DMP to that of the issue at stake. Involving a diversity of participants is expected
to increase the potential of meaningful contributions (Emerson et al., 2011). Below
(2) we discuss how in a longer participatory process, participants can be educated
and empowered to be able to contribute more meaningfully.
 Structured knowledge integration: The process ought to facilitate knowledge exchange
and input by participants. Structured methods to achieve this include individual
interviews, participatory modeling (Renn, 2006; Rowe & Frewer, 2005), transactive
memory systems (Heikkila & Gerlak, 2013), and methods that translate between “lay”
and “expert” types of knowledge (Edelenbos et al., 2011).
2. Education and empowerment of participants for more meaningful participation. Mean-
ingful public input does not occur automatically, but often presupposes capacity
building among participants. This can happen during a participatory process,
where information exchange informs and empowers participants, increasing their
ability to provide constructive, environmentally relevant input.
M II.2: Participation improves participants’ understanding of the issues at hand,
increasing the likelihood of their providing constructive, environmentally relevant
input.
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As Beierle and Cayford (2002, p. 15) assert, “[i]ncreasing public understanding of
environmental problems builds capacity for solving those problems [. . . and] to for-
mulate alternatives.” Laird (1993) argues that participation can empower participants
by improving their understanding and capacity to analyze an issue. Thus, in a collabo-
rative setting, “participants must generate enhanced or new capacities for joint action
that did not previously exist” (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015).
For capacity building among participants, communication must allow for two-
way information flow. The extent to which participation and collaboration improve
participants’ knowledge and capacity depends on several factors:
 Knowledge deficit (participants): A precondition for this mechanism is that partici-
pants are not already sufficiently knowledgeable, which is typically the case in
“technically intensive” issues (Laird, 1993). While this may seem obvious, it
means that there will be relatively straightforward issues where participant
capacity building is simply unnecessary.
 Engaged participants: Participants must be interested in the subject, willing to lis-
ten, and prepared to engage with the perspective of the administration. This may
be lacking in highly conflictual situations where levels of trust are low (Heikkila
& Gerlak, 2013). Conversely, participants should critically engage with expert
knowledge and advice in “their efforts to form their own view on the issue under
consideration” (Laird, 1993, p. 354).
 Understandable and unbiased information: Information provided by the organizers
must be comprehensive and understandable for interested lay stakeholders.
Where information is skewed or biased, or certain views or community sectors
are over-represented, uptake of information by participants is likely to be
impaired (Coenen, 2008).
3. Knowledge and environmental outputs. Assuming that participation does make rel-
evant knowledge available to environmental DMPs, and that interaction in partici-
patory settings can foster this by informing and empowering stakeholders, it is
further argued that:
M II.3: A higher degree of environmentally relevant knowledge made available to a
DMP leads to higher environmental standards of the output.
However, the fact that knowledge is contributed does not imply it will auto-
matically inform a decision. First, knowledge may be framed and interpreted
differently by various actors, as has been highlighted repeatedly (for a recent
overview, see Heikkila & Gerlak, 2013). To inform decision making, knowledge
needs to be framed and seen as useful to this end. Second, public decision mak-
ing is a political process shaped by interests and power, as discussed in cluster
I above. Political will to draw on knowledge made available during a DMP—
both by decision makers and by interested stakeholders—is thus a precondition,
notably with regard to the formal decision-making stage following a participa-
tory format (Flynn, 2008).
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4. Knowledge and implementation. In addition to improving outputs, stakeholder
knowledge harnessed or generated in participatory processes may also improve
implementation.
M II.4: Environmentally relevant and implementation-relevant knowledge
included in a decision makes implementation of the decision more likely.
The key idea is that an output that builds on the practical knowledge and expe-
rience of stakeholders, and thereby targets solutions that are accepted by imple-
menting actors, is more likely to be implemented than one that lacks this kind of
grounding in (local) knowledge (Ulibarri, 2015). Whether or not implementation
actually happens depends on multiple factors, which are addressed in more detail
in M IV.5 below (e.g., acceptance by implementers and decision makers).
3.3. Cluster III: Group Interaction, Learning, and Mutual Benefits
Participation as reflected in mechanism clusters I and II above can be
thought of as “additively” valuable in that decision making profits from inputs
(e.g., environmental concerns, or environmentally relevant knowledge). How-
ever, participation can also be “multiplicatively” valuable in that the interaction
of participants yields solutions that “would not have occurred to the participants
individually” (Smith, 2003, p. 62). We identify mechanisms capturing the effects
of different kinds of dialogic processes (negotiation, open dialogue, deliberation,
and consensus seeking), the types of solutions they can produce (mutual gains,
innovation, and common good orientation) and their environmental implica-
tions, both positive and negative.
1. Negotiation and mutual gains for environmentally beneficial outputs. The first mecha-
nism in this cluster asserts that negotiation—underpinned by communication and
bargaining—allows for the identification of positive-sum solutions. Compared to a
non-negotiated outcome, a positive-sum (“win-win”) solution represents an
improved allocation of the resources at stake in a DMP, so that all or many affected
interests benefit, including the environment (Brody, 2003).
M III.1: A DMP characterized by a higher degree of communication and bargain-
ing is more likely to lead to the identification of mutual gains than a DMP with lit-
tle or no communication and bargaining.
This refers to a form of dialogue that—in contrast to more restricted participa-
tion modes such as petitions or public hearings—is communication intensive
(Beierle & Cayford, 2002; Susskind, Levy, & Thomas-Larmer, 2000). Intensive face-
to-face dialogue (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Delli Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2004) creates
conditions under which negotiating parties discover in an active manner each
other’s perspectives, capabilities, needs, and preferences (Emerson & Nabatchi,
2015). Consequently, participants will be more likely to arrive at a solution that
increases mutual gains (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Compared to deliberative processes,
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discussed below, negotiation is less ambitious, and parties need not develop a com-
mon value basis or shared purpose, but rather pursue their own self-interest.
The basic premise for negotiation to happen is that participants’ exit options
are not preferable to negotiation (cf. the discussion in I.2). Whether or not a par-
ticipatory process involving negotiation will produce mutual gains depends on
procedural fairness, potentially through professional facilitation (Susskind,
McKearnan, & Thomas-Larmer, 1999). Identifying mutual gains likely increases
chances that the environment will also benefit, but this also depends on the rep-
resentation of environmental concerns in the DMP (cluster I).
2. Open dialogue, innovation and learning for environmentally beneficial outputs. Beyond
securing mutual gains, dialogue may foster innovation beneficial to the
environment.
M III.2: A participatory DMP characterized by open dialogue more likely leads to
the development of creative and innovative solutions to environmental problems
than one without open dialogue.
Interaction and dialogue among diverse participants potentially produces
innovative results through the exchange of different perspectives, information,
and knowledge conducive to mutual learning (Fazey et al., 2013; Heikkila & Ger-
lak, 2013). Learning by individuals and/or groups of participants may imply
improved understanding of other participants’ perspectives and the problem at
hand, and/or transformation of views and values via critical reflection (Connick
& Innes, 2003; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). Innovation and win-win solutions
often go hand-in-hand, and through learning and developing new ways of think-
ing, long-term impasses can be overcome (cf. examples in Connick & Innes,
2003). Exchanging perspectives and knowledge of different types appears to be
particularly beneficial in situations of radical uncertainty, where problems are
characterized by indeterminacy, complexity, or incommensurability (Ansell,
2016; Pellizzoni, 2003).
As the mechanisms underlying innovation are centered on knowledge and
learning, the same conditioning factors as discussed for M II.1 to M II.3 apply.
Apart from process design that allows for open and fair dialogue, high levels of
trust and a shared sense of purpose among participants provide favorable condi-
tions for positive outcomes (Connick & Innes, 2003; Heikkila & Gerlak, 2013; Oh
& Bush, 2014). Facilitation is held to be conducive to effective knowledge
exchange, and to compensate for strategic behavior (Fazey et al., 2013).
3. Deliberation and environmentally beneficial outputs. Possibly the most promising—
but also the most demanding—mechanism of dialogical processes is deliberation.
While many scholars understand deliberation as encompassing interaction forms
such as open dialogue and negotiation (e.g., Smith, 2003), we use it here in a more
narrow, Habermasian sense in order to more clearly distinguish the different
mechanisms.
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M III.3: A deliberative participatory process setting is more likely to produce an
orientation of participants’ views toward the common good, and therefore more
likely to produce outputs more favorable to the environment, than a nondeliberative
DMP.
A deliberative setting is characterized by “candid and reasoned communication
and information exchange that is structured and oriented toward problem solving”
(Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015), as opposed to mere bargaining or negotiation (Elster,
2000). It is undistorted by power play, transparent, and fair, based on clear rules
that enable unimpeded dialogue (e.g., through professional facilitation), and charac-
terized by a trustful atmosphere (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015;
Innes & Booher, 1999; Smith, 2003). The dialogue is conducive to following the
most “reasonable” argument in the Habermasian sense (Fung & Wright, 2001;
Webler & Tuler, 2000).
These process factors are expected to lead to a common good orientation of
the discourse, characterized by “preferences and justifications which are
‘public-spirited’ in nature [because] preferences held on purely self-interested
grounds become difficult to defend in a deliberative context” (Smith, 2003, p.
63). A deliberative setting is expected to “transform initial policy preferences
(which may be based on private interest [. . .], prejudice and so on) into ethical
judgements on the matter in hand” (Miller, 1992, p. 62) and toward an output
that secures benefits for all parties and the environment (Aldred & Jacobs,
2000). This distinguishes deliberation from the other mechanisms described in
this cluster.
The quality of deliberation and its outcomes depends on the provision of a
safe and protected space for participants, where they can speak freely and
exchange in a meaningful way (Birnbaum, 2016; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015).
This includes strategies for accommodating pronounced power imbalances
(Choi & Robertson, 2014; Selin & Chavez, 1995).
Whether or not the environment profits from deliberation may depend on
the extent to which an environmental issue actually is a “common good” issue
(as opposed to affecting a particular group of individuals).
4. Veto players and consensus at the lowest common denominator. On the downside of
participatory group interaction, there is a danger that participation hampers agree-
ment in decision making. Particularly (but not exclusively) in processes striving for
consensus, the participation of a large number of actors who can potentially veto a
decision may be detrimental to achieving public-good-oriented solutions.
M III.4: The more veto players involved in a DMP, the more likely the output will
have lower environmental standards.
A veto player is “an individual or collective actor whose agreement is required
for a policy decision” (Tsebelis, 1995, p. 293). In the context of environmental gover-
nance, it has been claimed that with an increasing number of veto players, dramatic
changes of the status quo are less likely, with solutions instead being based on the
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lowest common denominator, with negative consequences for the environmental
standard of outputs (Brandt & Svendsen, 2013; Brody, 2003; Layzer, 2008; Tsebelis,
1995). Whether or not this occurs likely depends on:
 Mode of decision making: Where consensus is not necessary, fewer veto positions
exist.
 Degree of conflict: The further the positions of participants differ, the less scope for
negotiation, and the more likely that solutions will emerge at the lowest common
denominator (Tsebelis, 1995). Consequently, planners aiming to arrive at imple-
mentable solutions try to enlarge negotiation space from the outset.
 Participants’ willingness and ability to cooperate: This applies both to the attitude of
participants in general, and to the leeway that representatives of organizational
actors have to negotiate in a DMP (Tsebelis, 1995).
3.4. Cluster IV: Acceptance and Conflict Resolution for Implementation
A fourth main function of participation and collaboration is to foster the accep-
tance of decisions, with a view to better compliance and implementation (Birnbaum,
2016; Bulkeley & Mol, 2003). We distinguish between implementation as “actions by
public and private individuals (or groups) that are directed at the achievement of
objectives set forth in prior policy decisions,” including “one-time efforts to trans-
form decisions into operational terms, as well as continuing efforts to achieve the
large and small changes mandated by policy decisions” (van Meter & van Horn,
1975, p. 447); and compliance as “the specific obedience or lack thereof to a law or
directive” (van Meter & van Horn, 1975, p. 454).4
Arguably, acceptance is crucial for effective governance, because outputs with a
high environmental standard on paper but little acceptance by addressees and
implementers are likely to remain symbolic and ineffective, if implementation cannot
be centrally monitored and enforced (Ulibarri, 2015). Different types of environmen-
tal decisions, however, rely on different implementation activities and/or compli-
ance by specific actor groups.
1. Accommodation of interests. The most straightforward mechanism in this cluster
assumes that in an inclusive, participatory process, acceptance may develop due to
a sense of “decision ownership,” if the output reflects participants’ concerns (Brody,
2003; Chess & Purcell, 1999; Newig, 2012):
M IV.1: A higher degree of participation leads to the accommodation of more diverse
interests in the output, which increases acceptance by stakeholders.
This requires meaningful contributions from participants, and the willingness
of authorities to consider participants’ interests in a final decision (Edelenbos
et al., 2011). Representatives must be perceived as legitimate spokespersons by
affected stakeholders (Brody, 2003; Newig, 2012). Likewise, the exclusion of
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important groups with means to oppose the implementation of a decision (e.g.,
through legal challenges) bears the danger of nonacceptance (Layzer, 2002).
2. Procedural fairness. “No matter how good an agreement is by some standards, if
it was reached by a process that was not regarded as fair, open, inclusive, account-
able, or otherwise legitimate, it is unlikely to receive support” (Innes & Booher,
1999, p. 415). Expressed positively, we suggest that:
M IV.2: A DMP that is perceived as fair and legitimate is likely to be accepted by
participants, their respective constituencies, and other stakeholders.
If stakeholders believe that a process was run fairly, and they trust in the purpose
of the process, they are more likely to accept the final decision and other outcomes of
the process (Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987; Webler & Tuler, 2000). A strong sense of
procedural justice among stakeholders can even increase acceptance of decisions that
do not reflect the substantive interests of all stakeholders (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Won-
dolleck & Yaffee, 2000).
Characteristics of a fair and just process include:
 Early and meaningful involvement for those directly participating—that is, fair
representation (Newig, 2007; Webler & Tuler, 2006) and no foregone conclusions
(Diduck & Sinclair, 2002; Newig, 2012).
 A certain level of trust on the part of stakeholders in the intentions of the process
organizers and institutions (Webler & Tuler, 2000) and, on the part of the organiz-
ers, unbiased enforcement of rules and standards (Birnbaum, 2016).
 Within-process communication that permits participants to express their views:
“Citizens value opportunities to speak, whether or not this voice is linked to
influence over the decisions made by the political body” (Lind & Tyler, 1988,
p. 170).
 Mediation, if needed, should be impartial (Webler & Tuler, 2000).
 For stakeholders outside of the immediate process, perceptions of fairness may rely
on transparency (Reed, 2008) and accountability (Webler & Tuler, 2000, 2006).
Note that these process characteristics bear resemblance to those required for deliber-
ation and open dialogue. Yet while deliberation requires a collaborative setting, a
fair and legitimate process likely to produce acceptance is less demanding in terms
of the quality of participant exchange.
3. Negotiation, mutual gains, and conflict resolution for acceptance. A third route to
acceptance is via outputs that make more stakeholders better-off. Processes that
produce such positive-sum solutions (as discussed in mechanism III.1) may involve
the successful resolution of conflicts.
M IV.3: Mutual gains and conflict resolution resulting from negotiation increase
stakeholders’ acceptance of the output.
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While a solution assuring mutual gains may be more acceptable to negotiating
parties (Susskind et al., 1999), the extent to which it is more widely accepted—for
example, by stakeholders and the public at large—depends on negotiating parties’
representativeness of their wider constituencies (Elster, 2000).
In the case of value conflicts, especially where actors hold strongly opposing val-
ues, conflict resolution can be difficult. However, skilled facilitators or mediators may
be able to bring initially adversarial parties together, establishing and maintaining
ground-rules for negotiation (Leach & Pelkey, 2001), and ensuring fairness. The
extent to which a given consensus or resolution is accepted in the longer run, and by
stakeholders and addressees beyond the immediate participants, is likely to depend
on those factors at work in conjunction with the generation of acceptance more gener-
ally (see M IV.1).
4. Waking sleeping dogs.
M IV.4: Raising stakeholders’ awareness of issues, and their involvement in deci-
sion making, leads them to consider possible negative effects of decisions and thus
increases opposition to environmentally beneficial measures.
In addition to resolving conflicts, participation can also (i) introduce conflict
over who counts as a legitimate participant; and (ii) fuel conflict by heightening
stakeholder sensitivities to adverse aspects or implications of a decision (Coglianese,
1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1994). Participants “may also find that the more time they
invest in a rulemaking proceeding, the less willing they are to overlook imperfec-
tions of the rule” (Coglianese, 1997, pp. 1326–27).
In light of these effects, the promise of participation can lead to unrealistic
expectations among stakeholders as to what a participatory process can accom-
plish (Coglianese, 1997). Whether participation actually increases conflict or
opposition to a decision depends in part on the interests at stake. The more
stakeholders have a (potentially) high stake in the issue, and the more pro-
nounced the conflicts among stakeholders, the more likely this mechanism is to
operate. Careful stakeholder analysis may help avoid conflict via the first sub-
mechanism by ensuring that no potential veto players are left out of the pro-
cess. The second submechanism is likely to be more important where
environmental issues remain relatively obscure and have not been widely pub-
licly debated.
5. Acceptance for implementation and compliance. Ultimately, acceptance of environ-
mental decisions, generated through participatory and collaborative processes, is
expected to foster implementation and compliance, thus strengthening environmen-
tal performance (Stave, 2002):
M IV.5: The greater the degree of acceptance by stakeholders, the higher the likeli-
hood of implementation and compliance.
This may happen through (i) reduction of opposition to outputs, and (ii)
generation of support for outputs. The former argument, commonly found in
the consensus building and conflict resolution literatures, holds that acceptance
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generated in a participatory process (e.g., via negotiation, positive-sum effects,
procedural justice) reduces opposition to the output (e.g., through litigation)
and potential noncompliance, thereby facilitating implementation (Bulkeley &
Mol, 2003; Innes & Booher, 1999; Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987).
The latter argument links acceptance to stakeholders’ increased willingness
to (co-)implement and voluntarily comply with outputs. In this sense, acceptance
actively and positively motivates stakeholders (Coenen, 2008; Layzer, 2002). This
assumes that stakeholders are addressees or potential co-deliverers of a given
decision, or perform some other function in implementation.
As Beierle and Cayford (2002) warn, the link between participation and
implementation should not be taken for granted. A number of factors can have a
significant influence:
 Even where a participatory process produces agreement on goals and objectives,
disagreement can arise over implementation, which can be delayed or stalled;
 If a DMP has excluded important actors—for example, politicians and bureau-
crats, private sector actors—implementation may be hampered by those groups
(see also M III.4);
 As there may be a considerable time lag between decision making and implemen-
tation, circumstances may change such that implementation as initially envisaged
becomes infeasible or undesirable.
3.5. Cluster V: Capacity Building for Implementation and Compliance
Participatory governance can provide decision makers and participants with
information and build individual and collective capacities that aid implementation
and compliance.
1. Informing policy addressees.
M V.1: Participation of policy addressees in decision making improves implementa-
tion and compliance.
Involving those state and nonstate actors who will be responsible for imple-
menting and/or complying with an output informs them and increases their capac-
ity to act, adapt, and behave in ways conducive to implementation and compliance
(Brody, 2003; Innes & Booher, 2004; Newig, 2007). Through involvement in the
DMP, policy addressees become more informed on the issue at hand (Koontz &
Thomas, 2006; Pellizzoni, 2003) and become alerted to opportunities for voluntary
action (Campbell, Koontz, & Bonnell, 2011).
Arguably, various process characteristics will influence the uptake of infor-
mation by participants; these have been described in the context of M II.2
above.
Of further relevance are the conditioning factors mentioned in M IV.5 that
affect whether or not actors are likely to engage in or facilitate implementation.
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2. Networks for implementation.
M V.2: Participation fosters the formation or strengthening of networks among
participants, which leads to improved implementation and compliance.
Intensive communication and repeated interaction in participatory DMPs
likely result in more frequent, and perhaps also more selective, relationships
with other actors. Once these relationships become more stable (typically out-
lasting the original DMP), we may speak of governance networks (Poocharoen &
Ting, 2015). Either new networks are formed, or pre-existing networks may be
strengthened, thus facilitating joint action. It is assumed that participants come
to recognize that others have important knowledge and capacities, or common
interests (Layzer, 2008; Oh & Bush, 2014), which helps to build shared motiva-
tion for joint action (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Innes & Booher, 2004; Sayles &
Baggio, 2017).
Networks of stakeholders potentially mobilize collectively held knowledge
and capacities in ways that are appropriate to and supportive of implementation
(Weible & Sabatier, 2005). First, the sense of common purpose and shared moti-
vation (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015) that underpins network development
increases the potential of collective action (Poocharoen & Ting, 2015). Second,
networks can aid mutual monitoring and social control, thus fostering the detec-
tion of noncompliance (Leach & Pelkey, 2001; Ostrom, 1990).
The formation and efficacy of such relationships and networks depend
on a range of factors. Actors’ becoming part of a network in the first place
depends on the incentive structures a process provides, as well as actors’
motivation and goals (Lubell, 2013). For organizers, this means that atten-
tion must be paid to the costs of participating, taking into account existing
ties among actors, while stakeholders need to recognize their mutual com-
patibility and the benefits of resources exchange (Booher & Innes, 2002; Rho-
des, 2008). How far networks aid implementation and compliance may
depend on the structure of the network. For example, dense networks are
expected to be more conducive to collective action, because they better facil-
itate resource and information exchange (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Poo-
charoen & Ting, 2015).
4. Discussion and Conclusion
Table 1 summarizes all 19 mechanisms and specifies the conditioning variables
associated with the dependent and independent variables. Independent variables are
defined as the central features of a (participatory) process. These embody variations
of the governance dimensions developed in section 2 (breadth of involvement, com-
munication and collaboration, power delegation). Conditioning variables, which
impact on the relation between dependent and independent variables, may be asso-
ciated with the external context in which DMPs take place, or with factors internal to
a DMP, relating to the design and functioning of processes themselves. From the
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viewpoint of a process organizer, external factors can in principle be taken as given,
determining the scope of possible process design options. For example, if process
organizers are aware of knowledge deficits on the part of stakeholders (external fac-
tors), they are in a position to choose an appropriate process design (M II.2) in order
to deal with this challenge. Internal factors represent the particular process specifica-
tions of a mechanism (e.g., facilitation or early involvement). Internal conditioning
variables bear resemblance to independent variables, as both are under the control of
the process organizer. However, independent variables refer to the general mode of
governance (more or less participatory and/or collaborative in three dimensions),
whereas internal conditioning variables specify the process-related conditions under
which a particular mode of governance is likely to be effective with regard to a par-
ticular mechanism.
Many conditioning factors are repeatedly mentioned (e.g., process facilita-
tion, trust-building, not excluding important groups, stakeholders’ environmen-
tal orientation). While this highlights the relative importance of these factors, it
does not mean that these are universally important “success factors” for partici-
patory processes.
Generally, it must be emphasized that despite the analytical stance we have
taken here, these mechanisms will not occur in isolation in a given decision-
making setting, but are often closely interrelated. In particular, mechanisms that
rely on the same independent and conditioning variables are likely to occur in
conjunction. For example, deliberation may enhance the environmental quality
of a political decision (M III.3), while at the same time its structural features of
discursive fairness are beneficial for gaining acceptance among stakeholders
and the public (M IV.2) and, ultimately, fostering implementation and compli-
ance. From a process-organizer perspective, this implies opportunities but also
challenges. For example, intensive face-to-face interaction may both enable
social learning (cluster III), and foster networks for implementation (cluster V).
Conversely, involving stakeholders in decision making may entail many
“positive” effects for environmental outputs (cluster I in particular), but also
“wake sleeping dogs” (M IV.5).
While this article has focused on the instrumental value of participation for the
environment, we find that many of the independent and conditioning variables
relate to aspects of democratic legitimacy, such as access to decision making, bal-
anced representation, and procedural fairness. This supports the argument that dem-
ocratic legitimacy and effectiveness are in many ways closely related in participatory
public environmental decision making.
We have illustrated how unpacking and disaggregating competing claims allows
for a more precise identification of the opposing mechanisms that underpin these
claims as well as the relevant conditioning factors that separate them. Together, these
steps can help take us beyond generalizations about the effectiveness (or lack
thereof) of participatory governance, while also illuminating specific contextual fac-
tors that help explain contradictory claims.
We see at least three areas for further research, which at the same time demar-
cate both the potential and the limitations of this study.
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First, our treatment of (participatory) process features has deliberately remained
rather abstract, owing to the goal of precisely describing causal mechanisms that are
valid across a broad range of actual situations. Future research could link the identi-
fied mechanisms and internal conditioning factors to particular participatory formats
and instruments, such as citizen juries, watershed collaborations, deliberative opin-
ion polls, and so forth.
Second, while this study has focused on environmental decision making,
several of the mechanisms described here are likely to have more general rele-
vance and apply to other sectors, such as public health, spatial planning, or
budgeting.
Third, we see great potential for this framework to structure and guide
empirical research on the effectiveness of participatory governance. The mecha-
nisms and variables put forth here could serve as a basis for the formation of
testable hypotheses. One promising avenue by which to test such hypotheses is
to conduct meta-analytical research to consolidate findings from the case record.
Case-survey meta-analysis (Beierle & Cayford, 2002; Newig & Fritsch, 2009) pro-
vides a formal and structured means to draw upon the rich qualitative data con-
tained in numerous (single) case studies. In an ongoing research program, we
draw on this method to code a number of variables relating to context, process,
and outcomes for a large-N sample of cases of participatory decision making
(Newig et al., 2013). This will produce a semiquantitative dataset suitable for for-
mal statistical analysis in order to shed light on the effect of key variables in vari-
ous contexts. As a complementary method, there is considerable scope to employ
causal process tracing (Mahoney, 2012) in order to assess the extent to which dif-
ferent mechanisms and clusters of mechanisms are relevant to particular cases,
and to examine specific causal mechanisms. Both approaches, especially if
employed in combination with other primary research methods such as compar-
ative case studies, and field experimentation, have the potential to substantially
improve our conceptual models and our knowledge on what works under what
conditions in environmental governance.
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Germany.
Nicolas W. Jager is a post-doctoral research associate with the Research Group on
Governance, Participation and Sustainability, at Leuphana University Lüneburg,
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Notes
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1. Out of 423 articles listed in Scopus containing “participatory governance” in title, abstract, or key-
words, 46 percent were associated with European countries, 23 percent with North America, 9 per-
cent with Asia. By contrast, out of 479 articles on “collaborative governance,” 40 percent were
associated with North America, 29 percent with Europe, 10 percent with Asia (search date December
1, 2016).
2. We define stakeholders as actors potentially affected by the environmental problem and the conse-
quences of possible solutions. These may be individual citizens or representatives of governmental,
private sector, or civil society groups or organizations.
3. In line with much of the literature (e.g., Ansell & Gash, 2008), we define “outcomes” broadly as the
ensemble of outputs and actions that follow from these, and subsequent implementation.
4. It is a truism that implementation and compliance do not necessarily advance the common good.
Likewise, participatory and collaborative decision making may produce benefits “beyond compli-
ance” (Rogers &Weber, 2010). For the sake of clarity and parsimony, we assume implementation of
and compliance with policy outputs to be generally favorable in environmental terms.
References
Aldred, Jonathan, and Michael Jacobs. 2000. “Citizens and Wetlands: Evaluating the Ely Citizens’ Jury.”
Ecological Economics 34: 217–32.
Amy, Douglas J. 1987. The Politics of Environmental Mediation. New York: Columbia University Press.
Ansell, Chris. 2016. “Collaborative Governance as Creative Problem-Solving.” In Enhancing Public Innova-
tion by Transforming Public Governance, ed. Jacob Torfing, and Peter Triantafillou. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 35–44.
Ansell, Chris, and Alison Gash. 2008. “Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice.” Journal of Pub-
lic Administration Research and Theory 18 (4): 543–71.
Beierle, Thomas C., and Jerry Cayford. 2002. Democracy in Practice: Public Participation in Environmental
Decisions. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future.
Berry, Jeffrey M. 1981. “Beyond Citizen Participation: Effective Advocacy Before Administrative
Agencies.” Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 17 (4): 463–77.
Berry, William D., Matt Golder, and Daniel Milton. 2012. “Improving Tests of Theories Positing Inter-
action.” Journal of Politics 74: 653–71.
Birnbaum, Simon. 2016. “Environmental Co-Governance, Legitimacy, and the Quest for Compliance:
When and Why Is Stakeholder Participation Desirable?” Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning
18: 306–23.
Booher, David E., and Judith E. Innes. 2002. “Network Power in Collaborative Planning.” Journal of Plan-
ning Education and Research 21 (3): 221–36.
Brandt, Urs Steiner, and Gert Tinggaard Svendsen. 2013. “Is Local Participation Always Optimal for Sus-
tainable Action? The Costs of Consensus-Building in Local Agenda 21.” Journal of Environmental
Management 129: 266–73.
Brody, Samuel D. 2003. “Measuring the Effects of Stakeholder Participation on the Quality of Local Plans
Based on the Principles of Collaborative Ecosystem Management.” Journal of Planning Education and
Research 22 (4): 407–19.
Bulkeley, Harriet, and Arthur P. J. Mol. 2003. “Participation and Environmental Governance: Consensus,
Ambivalence and Debate.” Environmental Values 12 (2): 143–54.
Campbell, Joseph T., Tomas M. Koontz, and Joseph E. Bonnell. 2011. “Does Collaboration Promote
Grass-Roots Behavior Change? Farmer Adoption of Best Management Practices in Two Water-
sheds.” Society and Natural Resources 24 (11): 1127–41.
Newig et al.: Environmental Performance of Participation 25
Chess, Caron, and Kristen Purcell. 1999. “Public Participation and the Environment: Do We Know What
Works?” Environmental Science & Technology 33 (16): 2685–92.
Choi, Taehyon, and Peter J. Robertson. 2014. “Deliberation and Decision in Collaborative Governance: A
Simulation of Approaches to Mitigate Power Imbalance.” Journal of Public Administration Research
and Theory 24: 495–518.
Coenen, Frans H. J. M., ed. 2008. Public Participation and Better Environmental Decisions: The Promise and
Limits of Participatory Processes for the Quality of Environmentally Related Decision-making. Dordrecht,
the Netherlands: Springer.
Coglianese, Cary. 1997. “Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rule-
Making.” Duke Law Journal 46: 1255–346.
Connick, Sarah, and Judith E. Innes. 2003. “Outcomes of Collaborative Water Policy Making: Applying
Complexity Thinking to Evaluation.” Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 46 (2): 177–97.
Cooke, Bill. 2001. “The Social Psychological Limits of Participation?” In Participation: The New Tyranny?
ed. Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari. London: Zed Books, 102–21.
Delli Carpini, Michael X., Fay Lomax Cook, and Lawrence R. Jacobs. 2004. “Public Deliberation, Discur-
sive Participation, and Citizen Engagement: A Review of the Empirical Literature.” Annual Review of
Political Science 7: 315–44.
Diduck, Alan, and A. John Sinclair. 2002. “Public Involvement in Environmental Assessment: The Case
of the Nonparticipant.” Environmental Management 29 (4): 578–88.
Dietz, Thomas, and Paul C. Stern, eds. 2008. Public Participation in Environmental Assessment and Decision-
Making. Panel on Public Participation in Environmental Assessment and Decision Making, National
Research Council. Washington, DC: National Academic Press.
Dryzek, John S. 2005. The Politics of the Earth. Environmental Discourses, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Edelenbos, Jurian, Arwin Van Buuren, and Nienke van Schie. 2011. “Co-Producing Knowledge: Joint
Knowledge Production Between Experts, Bureaucrats and Stakeholders in Dutch Water Manage-
ment Projects.” Environmental Science and Policy 14: 675–84.
Elster, J. 1989. Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Elster, Jon. 2000. “Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies.” Journal of Constitutional Law
2 (2): 345–421.
Emerson, Kirk, and Tina Nabatchi. 2015. Collaborative Governance Regimes. Washington, DC: Georgetown
University Press.
Emerson, Kirk, Tina Nabatchi, and Stephen Balogh. 2011. “An Integrative Framework for Collaborative
Governance.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 22: 1–29.
Falleti, Tulia G., and Julia F. Lynch. 2009. “Context and Causal Mechanisms in Political Analysis.” Com-
parative Political Studies 42 (9): 1143–66.
Fazey, Ioan, Anna C. Evely, Mark S. Reed, Lindsay C. Stringer, Joanneke Kruijsen, Piran C. L. White,
Andrew Newsham et al. 2013. “Knowledge Exchange: A Review and Research Agenda for Environ-
mental Management.” Environmental Conservation 40 (1): 19–36.
Fischer, Frank. 2000. Citizens, Experts, and the Environment. The Politics of Local Knowledge. Durham, NC:
Duke University Press.
Flynn, Brendan. 2008. “Planing Cells and Citizen Juries in Environmental Policy: Deliberation and Its
Limits.” In Public Participation and Better Environmental Decisions. The Promise and Limits of Participa-
tory Processes for the Quality of Environmentally Related Decision-Making, ed. Frans H. J. M. Coenen.
Enschede, the Netherlands: Springer, 57–71.
Fung, Archon. 2006. “Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance.” Public Administration Review 66
(Special Issue): 66–75.
Fung, Archon, and Erik Olin Wright. 2001. “Deepening Democracy: Innovations in Empowered Participa-
tory Governance.” Politics & Society 29 (1): 5–41.
Geissel, Brigitte. 2009. “Participatory Governance: Hope or Danger for Democracy? A Case Study of Local
Agenda 21.” Local Government Studies 4: 401–14.
26 Policy Studies Journal, 00:00
Gerlak, Andrea K., Mark Lubell, and Tanya Heikkila. 2013. “The Promise and Performance of Collabora-
tive Governance.” In The Oxford Handbook of US Environmental Policy, ed. Sheldon Kamieniecki, and
Michael Kraft. New York: Oxford University Press, 413–34.
Goodin, Robert E. 1992. Green Political Theory. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Hedstr€om, Peter, and Petri Ylikoski. 2010. “Causal Mechanisms in the Social Sciences.” Annual Review of
Sociology 36: 49–67.
Heikkila, Tanya, and Andrea K. Gerlak. 2013. “Building a Conceptual Approach to Collective Learning:
Lessons for Public Policy Scholars.” Policy Studies Journal 41 (3): 484–512.
Heinelt, Hubert. 2002. “Achieving Sustainable and Innovative Policies through Participatory Governance
in a Multi-Level Context: Theoretical Issues.” In Participatory Governance in Multi-Level Context. Con-
cepts and Experience, ed. Hubert Heinelt, Panagiotis Getimis, Grigoris Kafkalas, Randall Smith, and
Erik Swyngedouw. Opladen, Germany: Leske1Budrich, 17–32.
Holzinger, Katharina. 2000. “Limits of Co-Operation: A German Case of Environmental Mediation.”
European Environment 10 (6): 293–305.
Hurlbert, Margot, and Joyeeta Gupta. 2015. “The Split Ladder of Participation: A Diagnostic, Strategic,
and Evaluation Tool to Assess When Participation is Necessary.” Environmental Science & Policy 50:
100–13.
Innes, Judith E., and David E. Booher. 1999. “Consensus Building and Complex Adaptive Systems. A
Framework for Evaluating Collaborative Planning.” Journal of the American Planning Association 65
(4): 412–23.
———. 2004. “Reframing Public Participation: Strategies for the 21st Century.” Planning Theory & Practice
5 (4): 419–36.
Irvin, Renee A., and John Stansbury. 2004. “Citizen Participation in Decision Making. Is It Worth the
Effort?” Public Administration Review 64 (1): 55–65.
Johnston, Erik W., Darrin Hicks, Ning Nan, and Jennifer C. Auer. 2011. “Managing the Inclusion Pro-
cess in Collaborative Governance.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 21: 699–
721.
Koontz, Tomas M. 1999. “Citizen Participation: Conflicting Interests in State and National Agency Policy
Making.” The Social Science Journal 36 (3): 441–58.
Koontz, Tomas M., and Craig W. Thomas. 2006. “What Do We Know and Need to Know about the
Environmental Outcomes of Collaborative Management?” Public Administration Review 66
(Suppl. 1): 111–21.
Laird, Frank N. 1993. “Participatory Analysis, Democracy, and Technological Decision Making.” Science,
Technology, & Human Values 18 (3): 341–61.
Lange, Philipp, Peter P. J. Driessen, Alexandra Sauer, Basil Bornemann, and Paul Burger 2013.
“Governing Towards Sustainability—Conceptualizing Modes of Governance.” Journal of Environ-
mental Policy and Planning 15 (3): 403–25.
Larson, Kelli L., and Denise Lach. 2008. “Participants and Non-Participants of Place-Based Groups: An
Assessment of Attitudes and Implications for Public Participation in Water Resource Management.”
Journal of Environmental Management 88: 817–30.
Layzer, Judith A. 2002. “Citizen Participation and Government Choice in Local Environmental Con-
troversies.” Policy Studies Journal 30 (2): 193–207.
———. 2008. Natural Experiments: Ecosystem-Based Management and the Environment. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Leach, William D., and Neil W. Pelkey. 2001. “Making Watershed Partnerships Work: A Review of the
Empirical Literature.” Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management 127 (6): 378–85.
Leach, William D., and Paul A. Sabatier. 2005. “To Trust an Adversary: Integrating Rational and Psy-
chological Models of Collaborative Policymaking.” American Political Science Review 99 (4): 491–
503.
Ley, Aaron J., and Edward P. Weber. 2015. “The Adaptive Venue Shopping Framework: How Emergent
Groups Choose Environmental Policymaking Venues.” Environmental Politics 24: 703–22.
Newig et al.: Environmental Performance of Participation 27
Lind, Edgar A., and Tom R. Tyler. 1988. The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice. New York: Plenum
Press.
Lubell, Mark. 2013. “Governing Institutional Complexity: The Ecology of Games Framework.” Policy
Studies Journal 41 (3): 537–59.
Mahoney, James. 2012. “The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences.” Sociological Methods
and Research 41 (4): 570–97.
Miller, David. 1992. “Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice.” Political Studies 40 (1): 54–67.
Newig, Jens. 2007. “Does Public Participation in Environmental Decisions Lead to Improved Environ-
mental Quality? Towards an Analytical Framework.” Communication, Cooperation, Participation (Inter-
national Journal of Sustainability Communication) 1 (1): 51–71.
———. 2012. “More Effective Natural Resource Management through Participatory Governance? Taking
Stock of the Conceptual and Empirical Literature—and Moving Forward.” In Environmental Gover-
nance. The Challenge of Legitimacy and Effectiveness, ed. Karl Hogl, Eva Kvarda, Ralf Nordbeck, and
Michael Pregernig. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 46–68.
Newig, Jens, Ana Adzersen, Edward Challies, Oliver Fritsch, and Nicolas Jager. 2013. Comparative Analy-
sis of Public Environmental Decision-Making Processes: A Variable-Based Analytical Scheme. INFU Discus-
sion Paper No. 37/13. L€uneburg, Germany: INFU. Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id52245518.
Newig, Jens, and Oliver Fritsch. 2009. “Environmental Governance: Participatory, Multi-Level—And
Effective?” Environmental Policy and Governance 19 (3): 197–214.
Newig, Jens, and Eva Kvarda. 2012. “Participation in Environmental Governance: Legitimate and
Effective?” In Environmental Governance. The Challenge of Legitimacy and Effectiveness, ed. Karl Hogl,
Eva Kvarda, Ralf Nordbeck, and Michael Pregernig. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 29–45.
Newig, Jens, Claudia Pahl-Wostl, and Katja Sigel. 2005. “The Role of Public Participation in Managing
Uncertainty in the Implementation of the Water Framework Directive.” European Environment 15 (6):
333–43.
Oh, Youngmin, and Carrie B. Bush. 2014. “Exploring the Role of Dynamic Social Capital in Collaborative
Governance.” Administration & Society 48: 216–36.
Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Political
Economy of Institutions and Decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pellizzoni, Luigi. 2003. “Uncertainty and Participatory Democracy.” Environmental Values 12 (2): 195–224.
Poocharoen, Ora-orn, and Bernard Ting. 2015. “Collaboration, Co-Production, Networks: Covergence of
Theories.” Public Management Review 17 (4): 587–614.
Purdy, Jill M. 2012. “A Framework for Assessing Power in Collaborative Governance Processes.” Public
Administration Review 72: 409–17.
Reed, Mark S. 2008. “Stakeholder Participation for Environmental Management: A Literature Review.”
Biological Conservation 114 (10): 2417–31.
Renn, Ortwin. 2006. “Participatory Processes for Designing Environmental Policies.” Land Use Policy 23:
34–43.
Rhodes, Roderick A. W. 2008. “Policy Network Analysis.” In The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, ed.
Michael Moran, Martin Rein, and Robert E. Goodin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 425–47.
Rockloff, Susan F., and Susan A. Moore. 2006. “Assessing Representation at Different Scales of Decision
Making: Rethinking Local is Better.” Policy Studies Journal 34 (4): 649–70.
Rogers, Ellen, and Edward P. Weber. 2010. “Thinking Harder about Outcomes for Collaborative Gover-
nance Arrangements.” The American Review of Public Administration 40 (5): 546–67.
Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1994. “Consensus vs. Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regulatory Negotiation.”
Duke Law Journal 43 (6): 1206–20.
Rowe, Gene, and Lynn J. Frewer. 2005. “A Typology of Public Engagement Mechanisms.” Science, Tech-
nology, & Human Values 30: 251–90.
Sabatier, Paul A., and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith. 1999. “The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Asses-
sment.” In Theories of the Policy Process, ed. Paul A. Sabatier. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 118–88.
28 Policy Studies Journal, 00:00
Sayles, Jesse S., and Jacopo A. Baggio. 2017. “Social-Ecological Network Analysis of Scale Mismatches in
Estuary Watershed Restoration.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of
America 114: E1776–85.
Schmitter, Philippe C. 2002. “Participation in Governance Arrangements: Is There Any Reason to Expect
It Will Achieve ‘Sustainable and Innovative Policies in a Multi-Level Context’?” In Participatory Gov-
ernance. Political and Societal Implications, ed. J€urgen R. Grote, and Bernard Gbikpi. Opladen,
Germany: Leske1Budrich, 51–69.
Scott, Tyler A. 2015. “Does Collaboration Make Any Difference? Linking Collaborative Governance to
Environmental Outcomes.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 34 (3): 537–66.
Scott, Tyler A., and Craig W. Thomas. 2017. “Unpacking the Collaborative Toolbox: Why and When Do
Public Managers Choose Collaborative Governance Strategies?” Policy Studies Journal 45 (1): 191–214.
Selin, Steve, and Deborah Chavez. 1995. “Developing a Collaborative Model for Environmental Planning
and Management.” Environmental Management 19 (2): 189–95.
Smith, Graham. 2003. Deliberative Democracy and the Environment. London: Routledge.
Stave, Krystyna A. 2002. “Using System Dynamics to Improve Public Participation in Environmental
Decisions.” System Dynamics Review 18 (2): 139–67.
Susskind, Lawrence, and Jeffrey Cruikshank. 1987. Breaking the Impasse. Consensual Approaches to Resolving
Public Disputes. New York: Basic Books.
Susskind, Lawrence, Paul F. Levy, and Jennifer Thomas-Larmer, eds. 2000. Negotiating Environmental
Agreements. How to Avoid Escalating Confrontation, Needless Costs; and Unnecessary Litigation. Washing-
ton, DC: Island Press.
Susskind, Lawrence, Sarah McKearnan, and Jennifer Thomas-Larmer, eds. 1999. The Consensus Building
Handbook: A Comprehensive Guide to Reaching Agreement. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Tsebelis, George. 1995. “Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamen-
tarism, Multicameralism and Multipartism.” British Journal of Political Science 25 (3): 289–325.
Turner, Matthew A., and Quinn Weninger. 2005. “Meetings with Costly Participation: An Empirical Ana-
lysis.” Review of Economic Studies 72 (1): 247–68.
Ulibarri, Nicola. 2015. “Tracing Process to Performance of Collaborative Governance: A Comparative
Case Study of Federal Hydropower Licensing.” Policy Studies Journal 43 (2): 283–308.
van Asselt, Marjolein B. A., and Jan Rotmans. 2002. “Uncertainty in Integrated Assessment Modelling:
From Positivism to Pluralism.” Climatic Change 54 (1–2): 75–105.
van Meter, Donald S., and Carl E. van Horn. 1975. “The Policy Implementation Process. A Conceptual
Framework.” Administration & Society 6 (4): 445–88.
Webler, Thomas, and Seth Tuler. 2000. “Fairness and Competence in Citizen Participation.” Administra-
tion & Society 32 (5): 566–95.
———. 2006. “Four Perspectives on Public Participation Process in Environmental Assessment and Deci-
sion Making: Combined Results from 10 Case Studies.” Policy Studies Journal 34 (4): 699–722.
Weible, Christopher M., and Paul A. Sabatier. 2005. “Comparing Policy Networks: Marine Protected
Areas in California.” Policy Studies Journal 33 (2): 181–202.
Whelan, James, and Kristen Lyons. 2005. “Community Engagement or Community Action: Choosing
Not to Play the Game.” Environmental Politics 14 (5): 596–610.
Wondolleck, Julia, and Steven Lewis Yaffee. 2000. Making Collaboration Work. Lessons from Innovation in
Natural Resource Management. Washington, DC: Island Press.
Wong, James K. 2015. “A Dilemma of Green Democracy.” Political Studies 64: 136–55.
Wynne, Brian. 1992. “Misunderstood Misunderstanding: Social Identities and Public Uptake of Science.”
Public Understanding of Science 1 (3): 281–304.
Young, Juliette C., Andrew Jordan, Kate R. Searle, Adam Butler, Daniel S. Chapman, Peter Simmons, and
Allan D. Watt. 2013. “Does Stakeholder Involvement Really Benefit Biodiversity Conservation?” Bio-
logical Conservation 185: 359–70.
Newig et al.: Environmental Performance of Participation 29
